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1 
ARTICLES 
APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE CODE: MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE AND THE 
TAX LAW’S REGULATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS’ 
POLITICAL SPEECH 
Edward A. Zelinsky* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky,1 the U.S. Supreme Court 
struck on First Amendment grounds Minnesota’s “political apparel 
ban.”2  This law prohibits individuals from wearing “political badges, 
political buttons, or other political insignia . . . at or about [any] 
polling place.”3  The Minnesota statute, the Court held, unreasonably 
restricts constitutionally protected expression at the polls.4  The 
statute’s “expansive”5 term political is “unmoored,”6 proscribing in 
“indeterminate”7 fashion not just buttons and clothing mentioning 
the candidates, parties, and ballot questions being voted upon, but 
also forbidding apparel referring to issues and groups extrinsic to the 
election.8  As it lacks “objective, workable standards,”9 the Court held, 
 
* Edward A. Zelinsky is the Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law at the Benjamin 
N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University.  For comments on prior drafts of this Article, 
Professor Zelinsky thanks Professors Brannon P. Denning, Mitchell L. Engler, Daniel Hemel, 
and David Rudenstine.  For research assistance, Professor Zelinsky thanks Xiaoquan Wu and 
Vincent Licata, both of the Cardozo Class of 2019. 
1 Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018). 
2 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1882, 1883, 1885. 
3 MINN. STAT. § 211B.11(1) (2019), invalidated by Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 
1876 (2018). 
4 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct at 1891–92. 
5 Id. at 1888. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 1889. 
8 See id. 
9 Id. at 1891. 
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the Minnesota law banning “political” apparel in polling places 
violates the First Amendment in light of “the potential for erratic 
application.”10 
Minnesota Voters Alliance thus confirmed the ability of voters to 
wear political clothes and buttons to the polls as long as such clothes 
and buttons do not mention candidates, political parties, or ballot 
questions at issue in the current election.11 
On its face, Minnesota Voters Alliance is about which t-shirts, hats, 
and buttons voters can wear at the polls.  However, the Court’s First 
Amendment analysis in Minnesota Voters Alliance extends beyond 
apparel at polling places.  That decision impacts the ongoing debate 
about the Johnson Amendment,12 the now controversial provision of 
the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) that forbids organizations listed 
in section 501(c)(3)13 from intervening in political campaigns.  
Minnesota Voters Alliance also affects the proper construction of 
section 501(c)(3)’s ban on lobbying by tax-exempt entities14 as well as 
other provisions of the tax law taxing and precluding campaign 
intervention by tax-exempt organizations.15 
Minnesota Voters Alliance requires that these provisions of the tax 
law16 be construed to comply with the First Amendment mandate 
that restrictions on speech be reasonable, objective, workable and 
determinate.  After Minnesota Voters Alliance, the Johnson 
Amendment should be interpreted as only proscribing 501(c)(3) 
entities from expressly endorsing or opposing particular candidates, 
 
10 Id. at 1890. 
11 See id. at 1891. 
12 For background on the Johnson Amendment, see EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, TAXING THE 
CHURCH: RELIGION, EXEMPTIONS, ENTANGLEMENT, AND THE CONSTITUTION 188–91 (2017) 
[hereinafter ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH], and Edward A. Zelinsky, Churches’ Lobbying and 
Campaigning: A Proposed Statutory Safe Harbor for Internal Church Communications, 69 
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1527, 1528, 1531 (2017) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Safe Harbor].  See also Ellen 
P. Aprill, Amending the Johnson Amendment in the Age of Cheap Speech, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 
ONLINE 1, 1. 
13 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH, supra note 12, at 188. 
14 For background on § 501(c)(3)’s ban on lobbying, see ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH, 
supra note 12, at 191, and Zelinsky, Safe Harbor, supra note 12, at 1529, 1532. 
15 See I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1 (as amended in 1990). 
16 The First Amendment standard of determinacy articulated in Minnesota Voters Alliance 
also impacts the proper understanding of § 162(e) of the Code, which denies for-profit trades 
and businesses an income tax deduction for outlays “incurred in connection with” lobbying and 
political campaigning.  I.R.C. § 162(e)(1) (2012); Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 
1891 (2018).  This Article focuses upon the implications of Minnesota Voters Alliance for 
nonprofit entities, both to keep the length of the Article manageable and also because the 
greatest contemporary controversy is about the political activities of nonprofit organizations, 
churches in particular. 
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political parties, or ballot questions or from engaging in the 
“functional equivalent” of such express advocacy.17  Under this test, 
tax-exempt entities would not be precluded from engaging in more 
general issue advocacy. 
The other provisions of the tax law preventing tax-exempt entities 
from participating in political campaigns and taxing such 
participation should be construed in the same way.  These other 
features of the tax law should be understood as precluding and taxing 
only express advocacy of, or opposition to, particular candidates, 
parties, or ballot questions, or as prohibiting and taxing the 
functional equivalent of such explicit expression. 
In light of Minnesota Voters Alliance, the 501(c)(3) lobbying ban 
should be interpreted similarly, as only prohibiting tax-exempt 
entities from explicitly supporting or opposing pending legislative 
proposals or from undertaking the functional equivalent of such 
explicit advocacy about pending legislation.  The 501(c)(3) lobbying 
ban should not prevent tax-exempt entities from discussing public 
policy questions more generally, even though such questions can be 
formulated as legislative proposals.  Section 4911 of the Code already 
propounds for certain electing exempt organizations such a First 
Amendment-compliant standard.18 
As currently understood by the IRS and the Treasury, the Code’s 
restrictions on the political expression of tax-exempt entities sweep 
too broadly and too vaguely to satisfy these constitutional standards.  
According to the IRS’s current administrative interpretation of the 
Johnson Amendment, that provision of the Code proscribes “issue 
advocacy that functions as political campaign intervention.”19  This 
expansive test is, like the Minnesota apparel statute struck in 
Minnesota Voters Alliance, unmoored and indeterminate and is, thus, 
unreasonable for First Amendment purposes.  To establish objective, 
workable standards in light of Minnesota Voters Alliance, the IRS’s 
construction of the Johnson Amendment should prohibit only explicit 
 
17 Cf. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007) (“[A] court should find that 
an ad is the ‘functional equivalent’ of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no 
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”). 
18 See I.R.C. § 4911 (2012).  As I discuss infra, some tax-exempt organizations may elect the 
safe harbor provided by I.R.C. § 501(h) for lobbying expenditures.  Section 501(h), in 
conjunction with § 4911, provides rules about lobbying more consonant with Minnesota Voters 
Alliance.  See I.R.C. §§ 501(h), 4911(a)–(b); Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891.  This Article 
argues that, as a matter of First Amendment law, these more determinant rules should, by 
administrative action or by modification of the Code, be extended to all tax-exempt entities, not 
just those which can and do make the § 501(h) safe harbor election. 
19 Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1424. 
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endorsements of, or opposition to, candidates, parties, and ballot 
issues involved in the current election and the functional equivalent 
of such express endorsement or opposition.  Under this more carefully 
tailored construction of the Johnson Amendment, nonprofit 
organizations, churches in particular, would no longer risk the loss of 
tax-exempt status by engaging in issue advocacy that falls short of 
overt support for, or opposition to, specific candidates, political 
parties, or ballot questions. 
Similarly, Minnesota Voters Alliance requires the reformation of 
the Treasury regulation that interprets the statutory ban preventing 
501(c)(3) organizations from “[a]dvocat[ing] the adoption or rejection 
of legislation.”20  Virtually any issue of public concern can result in 
legislation.21  Under Minnesota Voters Alliance, this expansive test 
should also, as a constitutional matter, be limited to the championing 
of, or opposition to, particular proposals currently pending before 
legislative bodies or slated for a popular vote.  Under this more 
precise construction of the Code’s general prohibition on lobbying by 
nonprofit organizations,22 such organizations, including churches, 
would not risk the forfeiture of tax-exempt status through their 
statements on public policy as long as such statements do not endorse 
or object to particular legislation that has been introduced in a 
lawmaking body or that is subject to an impending vote by the 
electorate. 
Part I of this Article explores the Court’s decision in Minnesota 
Voters Alliance, which establishes that, under the banner of 
reasonability, the First Amendment requires “objective, workable 
standards” when political expression is regulated by the 
government.23  Restrictions on voter apparel that mentions 
candidates, parties, and ballot questions satisfy this standard of 
reasonability; broader restrictions on “political” clothing do not.24 
Parts II, III, and IV explore, in light of Minnesota Voters Alliance, 
the provisions of the Code that regulate the political expression of 
tax-exempt institutions.  Part II examines Revenue Ruling 2007-41 
in which the IRS contends that, depending upon the “facts and 
circumstances” of particular instances, “issue advocacy” can 
 
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)(b) (as amended in 2017). 
21 See JOHN V. SULLIVAN, HOW OUR LAWS ARE MADE, H.R. Doc. No. 110-49, at 4 (2007). 
22 As noted in Section IV.B, infra, the more narrowly-tailored prohibition on tax-exempt 
lobbying implemented by §§ 501(h) and 4911 is more First Amendment compliant. 
23 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891. 
24 Id. at 1888 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
808–09 (1985)). 
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constitute forbidden campaign intervention for purposes of section 
501(c)(3).25  The Court’s analysis in Minnesota Voters Alliance implies 
that Revenue Ruling 2007-41, like the Minnesota apparel statute, 
sweeps too broadly and too imprecisely.26  Indeed, Revenue Ruling 
2007-41 unconstitutionally condemns as forbidden campaigning an 
ill-defined set of statements that address issues of public policy even 
if no candidate, party, or ballot question is explicitly endorsed or 
opposed.  
Part III discusses the tax imposed by section 527(f)27 on civic 
organizations, labor unions, business associations, and other tax-
exempt institutions when they attempt to “influence” elections.28  
This Part also discusses the Treasury regulation that holds that 
organizations tax-exempt under section 501(c)(4)29 cannot intervene 
in political campaigns.30  Minnesota Voters Alliance indicates that 
these provisions, as currently understood, are overly broad, often 
nebulous restrictions on political expression, too indeterminate to 
pass First Amendment scrutiny.31 
Part IV confronts the Code’s ban on lobbying by 501(c)(3) 
organizations.  Minnesota Voters Alliance indicates that this ban 
must also be construed more carefully to prohibit only express 
support for, or opposition to, particular bills pending before 
legislative bodies or scheduled for a popular vote.  An organization’s 
tax-exempt status should not be forfeited by statements about public 
policies that could be implemented by legislation since virtually any 
position on any public policy can be implemented by state, local or 
federal legislation.  Section IV.B highlights the Code’s disparate 
treatment of tax-exempt organizations which can and do elect the 
lobbying safe harbor provided by sections 501(h) and 4911 and the 
treatment of tax-exempt entities which cannot or do not make that 
election.  The former, by virtue of the safe harbor election, are subject 
to restrictions that are more consonant with the First Amendment 
standards of Minnesota Voters Alliance than are the latter. 
Having established that these provisions of the tax law are today 
understood too capaciously to pass First Amendment scrutiny, Part V 
 
25 Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1421, 1424. 
26 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781, 794 (1989)). 
27 I.R.C. § 527(f) (2012). 
28 See § 527(f)(1). 
29 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012). 
30 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990). 
31 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1888 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808–09 (1985)). 
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of this Article addresses the administrative understanding of these 
provisions which would satisfy the test of Minnesota Voters Alliance 
that restrictions on political expression be reasonable, objective, and 
determinant.  The particular implementation of that principle in 
Minnesota Voters Alliance does not work well in these other settings, 
that is, the Johnson Amendment, the section 527(f) tax on political 
participation, the Treasury regulation forbidding campaign 
intervention by civic leagues, and section 501(c)(3)’s general lobbying 
ban.  Under Minnesota Voters Alliance, states can forbid individuals 
from wearing to the polls buttons or clothes that mention candidates, 
parties, or ballot issues involved in the current election.32  This “no 
mention” test works well for voting place apparel because voting is a 
discrete activity which occurs briefly at a particular point in time.33  
In this setting, forbidding the names of candidates, parties, or ballot 
issues is a targeted rule easily administrable at a specific point in 
time, to wit, an election day presence at the polls. 
But this “no mention” test does not work well in other settings that 
extend over long periods.  The stricture against naming candidates, 
parties, and ballot questions is overly broad in other contexts and can 
interfere with much generalized political discussion.  Our political 
culture today is a “permanent campaign.”34  Except for public officials 
who are term-limited or who have formally renounced re-election, all 
public officials are continually running for re-election around the 
calendar.  If the no-mention-of-a-candidate rule applied to the 
Johnson Amendment, 501(c)(3) organizations could never utter the 
name of any elected official since all officials are today continuously 
running for re-election.  Thus, a rule against using the name of any 
candidate, despite its appeal in the context of apparel at the polls, 
would be overly broad in the context of the Johnson Amendment and 
would forbid much speech which is not campaign intervention. 
In lieu of the “no mention” test, I propose that, for purposes of 
applying Minnesota Voters Alliance to the Johnson Amendment, the 
applicable test should be the standard articulated by Chief Justice 
Roberts in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.35  Under this test, the 
Johnson Amendment would be understood as precluding the express 
 
32 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891. 
33 See Charles Stewart III, Waiting to Vote in 2012, 28 J.L. & POL. 439, 450 (2013) (finding 
that in 2008 and 2012 two-thirds of voters waited ten minutes or less to vote). 
34 See, e.g., Hugh Heclo, Campaigning and Governing: A Conspectus, in THE PERMANENT 
CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTURE 1, 26 (Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann eds., 2000). 
35 See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007). 
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advocacy of specific candidates, parties, or ballot questions and “the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy.”36  Tax-exempt entities 
and their personnel could mention public officials but could not 
articulate explicit support for, or opposition to, such officials’ re-
election.37  For these purposes, the functional equivalence of express 
advocacy would be defined restrictively as the Chief Justice did in 
Wisconsin Right to Life, namely, a statement “susceptible of no 
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or 
against a specific candidate.”38 
Likewise, the tax imposed by section 527(f) on the political activity 
of tax-exempt institutions and the 501(c)(4) regulations that prevent 
civic leagues from engaging in campaigning should only tax and 
preclude explicit endorsements of and opposition to particular 
candidates, parties, and ballot questions and the functional 
equivalent of such explicit support or opposition.  Again, functional 
equivalence should be construed narrowly as the Chief Justice did in 
Wisconsin Right to Life, that is, as “susceptible of no reasonable 
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate,”39 party, or ballot question. 
Similarly, section 501(c)(3)’s general lobbying ban should be 
understood to permit discussion of any public policy issue that could 
result in legislation.  To comply with the First Amendment 
reasonability test of Minnesota Voters Alliance,40 the 501(c)(3) 
lobbying ban should only prevent express advocacy for or against 
specific pending legislation or “the functional equivalent of such 
express advocacy.”41  This change could be accomplished 
administratively or legislatively, extending in either fashion the 
more precise standards of sections 501(h) and 4911 to all 501(c)(3) 
entities.42 
This Article then places Minnesota Voters Alliance in the context of 
Regan v. Taxation with Representation,43 which upheld against 
 
36 Id. 
37 Cf. id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1888 (2018) (“[T]he State must draw a 
reasonable line. . . . [T]he State must be able to articulate some sensible basis for distinguishing 
what may come in from what must stay out.” (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808–09 (1985)). 
41 Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 482. 
42 See I.R.C. § 501(h) (2012 & Supp. V 2018); I.R.C. § 4911 (2012). 
43 Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
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constitutional challenge section 501(c)(3)’s ban on lobbying.44  The 
Taxation with Representation Court did not confront the content of 
this ban; it merely held that such a ban is constitutional.45  Minnesota 
Voters Alliance similarly implies that the 501(c)(3) lobbying ban, 
properly construed, is constitutional.  But Minnesota Voters Alliance 
indicates that such constitutionality depends upon the lobbying ban 
being formulated reasonably, workably, and objectively.46 
Consequently, an institution should lose its tax-exempt status 
under the Johnson Amendment for campaigning only if such 
institution explicitly endorses or opposes a candidate, political party, 
or ballot issue or engages in expression that cannot reasonably be 
understood as other than such an endorsement or opposition.  
Similarly, an entity should forfeit its tax-exempt status for lobbying 
only if the entity supports or calls for defeat of a particular legislative 
proposal currently pending before a public lawmaking body or before 
the electorate.  In this way, Taxation with Representation is 
compatible with Minnesota Voters Alliance: tax-exempt organizations 
can be proscribed from lobbying and campaigning as long as such 
prohibited lobbying and campaigning is defined reasonably for First 
Amendment purposes.47  
Part VII addresses three potential rejoinders to my argument 
including an alternative, more restricted reading of Minnesota Voters 
Alliance as a case just about clothing.  This Part also addresses the 
limited support that the Chief Justice’s position enjoyed from the 
Court in Wisconsin Right to Life.  Finally, Part VII addresses the 
argument that the Code-based prohibitions on tax-exempt 
organizations’ campaigning and lobbying are in practice not 
aggressively enforced by the IRS. 
The Code need not be amended to fashion these statutory 
provisions to comply with Minnesota Voters Alliance, though 
modifying the language of the Code is one way that the Code’s 
restrictions on the political speech of tax-exempt entities could be 
brought into compliance with the First Amendment.  Alternatively, 
such compliance could be achieved administratively by revoking the 
portions of Revenue Ruling 2007-41 pertaining to issue advocacy 
 
44 See id. at 546, 550. 
45 See id. at 549–50.  But see id. at 553–54 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that 501(c)(3) 
organizations may lobby through a 501(c)(4) affiliate, but then cautioning that restricting 
501(c)(4) affiliates’ speech may render § 501(c)(3)’s ban constitutionally infirm). 
46 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891. 
47 See id. at 1888 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808–09); Taxation with Representation, 461 
U.S. at 550. 
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under the Johnson Amendment and by amending the regulations 
under section 501(c)(3) to clarify that forbidden lobbying occurs only 
when a tax-exempt entity explicitly supports or calls for defeat of a 
particular legislative proposal pending before a public lawmaking 
body or before the electorate.  Similarly, the IRS can modify Revenue 
Ruling 2004-6 to bring it into compliance with the First Amendment 
standard of determinacy announced in Minnesota Voters Alliance.  
Likewise, the Treasury can by regulation clarify that, for purposes of 
sections 527 and 501(c)(4),48 campaign intervention means explicit 
endorsement of, or opposition to, a candidate, not more generalized 
discussion of issues and legislation.  The Treasury would thereby 
interpret those Code-based restrictions on political activity in a 
manner that, contrary to current law, satisfies the First Amendment 
signposts of reasonability and determinacy articulated in Minnesota 
Voters Alliance. 
I.  MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE V. MANSKY 
The American polling station was once a rowdy place.49  Like other 
states of the union, Minnesota adopted a law designed to create an 
orderly environment in which voters cast their ballots.50  The 
Minnesota statute creates a zone within which campaigning, 
including the “display [of] campaign material,” may not occur.51  This 
campaign-free zone includes the polling place itself and extends to 
the area “within 100 feet of the building in which a polling place is 
situated.”52 
Minnesota’s statute also proscribes any person from “provid[ing] 
political badges, political buttons, or other political insignia to be 
worn at or about the polling place on the day of a primary or 
election.”53  These two provisions of the Minnesota law were not 
challenged in Minnesota Voters Alliance.54 
 
48 As noted infra, Congress has in the past blocked the Treasury from promulgating 
regulations under § 501(c)(4).  See infra note 236 and accompanying text.  It remains to be seen 
whether the current, 116th Congress will do so as well. 
49 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1882–83; see also Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 224–27 
(2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing traditional voting practices including viva voce 
voting). 
50 See MINN. STAT. § 211B.11(1) (2019), invalidated by Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. 
Ct. 1876 (2018); Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1882–83. 
51 § 211B.11(1). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1883. 
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The remaining portion of the Minnesota statute establishing 
polling place decorum was challenged and ultimately struck as 
unconstitutional:55 “A political badge, political button, or other 
political insignia may not be worn at or about the polling place on 
primary or election day.”56 
Those challenging this law did not seek to wear into the polls 
buttons or other insignia supporting or opposing candidates, political 
parties, or ballot questions involved in the current election.57  Rather, 
they wanted to display buttons and clothing reflecting more 
generalized political themes and affiliations.  One individual 
“planned to wear a ‘Tea Party Patriots’ shirt” into the polls.58  Other 
voters, protesting Minnesota’s lack of a voter identification law, 
sought to display buttons “with the words ‘Please I. D. Me,’ a picture 
of an eye, and a telephone number and web address for” an 
organization supporting voter identification laws.59  One of the 
plaintiffs wore the “[‘Please I. D. Me’] button and a T-shirt with the 
words ‘Don’t Tread on Me’ and the Tea Party Patriots logo.”60  “One 
individual was asked to cover up his Tea Party shirt” in order to 
vote.61  Another was allowed to vote only “after an election judge 
recorded” his name and address for potential referral for sanctions 
under the Minnesota statute forbidding “political” apparel at polling 
places in the North Star State.62 
When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court 
classified a polling place as a “nonpublic forum.”63  In such a forum, 
governments may enact speech regulation that is “reasonable in light 
of the purpose served by the forum”64 as long as such regulation is 
“not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials 
oppose the speaker’s view.”65 
Minnesota’s law flunked this First Amendment test of 
reasonability.  While states can regulate polling place apparel “so 
 
55 See id. at 1885. 
56 § 211B.11(1). 
57 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1884. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1886. 
64 Id. at 1885 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 
(1985)). 
65 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1885 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)). 
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that voters may focus on the important decisions immediately at 
hand[,] . . . the State must draw a reasonable line”66 between 
permitted and proscribed apparel: “[T]he unmoored use of the term 
‘political’ in the Minnesota law, combined with haphazard 
interpretations the State has provided in official guidance and 
representations to this Court, cause Minnesota’s restriction to fail 
even this forgiving test.”67  According to the Court, the Minnesota 
statute “does not define the term ‘political.’  And the word can be 
expansive.”68 
As an example, the Court observed that “a button or T-shirt merely 
imploring others to ‘Vote!’” could run afoul of the Minnesota 
prohibition on political apparel in the polling place.69  The use of the 
term “campaign material” in the first part of the Minnesota statute 
makes clear that “political” apparel is a “broader” category that goes 
beyond campaign-related clothing and buttons.70 
The Court indicated that a more carefully tailored statute 
regulating polling place apparel passes the constitutionally 
mandated test of reasonability.71  Central to this discussion of the 
Minnesota statute was a state-issued “Election Day Policy,” which 
reflected the state’s understanding of the statute.72  The Court 
approved as “clear enough” for First Amendment purposes three 
examples of forbidden apparel cited in that policy: “[I]tems displaying 
the name of a political party, items displaying the name of a 
candidate, and items demonstrating ‘support of or opposition to a 
ballot question.’”73 
However, the Court ruled, the Minnesota statute goes beyond these 
reasonable restrictions to ban at polling places apparel of an 
“indeterminate” nature.74  As construed by Minnesota in its Policy 
statement, the apparel statute prevents a voter from wearing at the 
polls any clothing or buttons that address “any subject on which a 
political candidate or party has taken a stance.”75  The Court 
expressed its disapproval: 
 
66 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1888. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1889. 
71 See id. at 1891. 
72 See id. at 1884. 
73 Id. at 1889. 
74 Id. at 1891. 
75 Id. at 1881. 
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 A rule whose fair enforcement requires an election judge to 
maintain a mental index of the platforms and positions of 
every candidate and party on the ballot is not reasonable.  
Candidates for statewide and federal office and major political 
parties can be expected to take positions on a wide array of 
subjects of local and national import.  Would a “Support Our 
Troops” shirt be banned, if one of the candidates or parties had 
expressed a view on military funding or aid for veterans?  
What about a “#MeToo” shirt, referencing the movement to 
increase awareness of sexual harassment and assault?  At oral 
argument, the State indicated that the ban would cover such 
an item if a candidate had “brought up” the topic.76 
Minnesota’s policy guide interpreting the political apparel statute 
also construed the statute’s ban on political clothing as prohibiting 
“any item ‘promoting a group with recognizable political views.’”77  
This, the Court sardonically observed, “makes matters worse.”78  This 
understanding of “political” apparel could proscribe at the polls 
clothing and buttons for “the American Civil Liberties Union, the 
AARP, the World Wildlife Fund, and Ben & Jerry’s, [which] all have 
stated positions on matters of public concern.”79  Indeed, under this 
interpretation of the Minnesota statute, the statute might forbid a 
Boy Scout troop leader from wearing his uniform when he votes, as 
the Boy Scouts have views on matters of public concern.80  The 
Minnesota political apparel ban is, thus, “an indeterminate 
prohibition”81 that invites “erratic application”82 because it lacks 
“objective, workable standards.”83 
The Court made clear that a more precise statute regulating 
polling place apparel could pass the First Amendment test of 
reasonability if it “proscrib[es] displays (including apparel) in more 
lucid terms.”84  Thus, for example, a state may protect polling place 
decorum by outlawing a button or shirt “relating to a candidate, 
 
76 Id. at 1889–90 (internal citations deleted). 
77 Id. at 1890. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 See id. 
81 Id. at 1891. 
82 Id. at 1890. 
83 Id. at 1891. 
84 Id. 
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measure, or political party appearing on the ballot.”85  By such 
targeted prohibitions, a state can create a polling place “removed 
from the clamor and din of electioneering.”86  But Minnesota’s statute 
is not “a law capable of reasoned application”87 and, thus, like the 
public school prohibition on anti-war arm bands invalidated in 
Tinker,88 runs afoul of the First Amendment because of “the potential 
for erratic application.”89  “[A]n indeterminate prohibition carries 
with it ‘[t]he opportunity for abuse.’”90 
II.  REVENUE RULING 2007-41 AND ISSUE ADVOCACY 
In Revenue Ruling 2007-41, the IRS describes its understanding of 
the reach of the Johnson Amendment, the provision of the Code that 
prevents organizations tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) from 
“participat[ing] in, or interven[ing] in (including the publishing or 
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office.”91 
Revenue Ruling 2007-41 is an administrative interpretation of the 
Johnson Amendment analogous to Minnesota’s Election Day Policy 
statement,92 which construes the Minnesota political apparel law, 
and has the same infirmities as does that statement.  What the Court 
said about the Minnesota statute and the policy statement 
interpreting that statute also applies to the Johnson Amendment and 
Revenue Ruling 2007-41.  Just as the Minnesota political apparel 
statute improperly bans as “political” clothing and buttons that 
advance generalized themes and groups without endorsing or 
opposing particular candidates, parties, and ballot questions,93 
Revenue Ruling 2007-41 categorizes as proscribed campaign 
 
85 Id. (quoting TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 61.010(a) (West 2019)). 
86 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1892. 
87 Id. While Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented in Minnesota Voters 
Alliance, she did not address the substantive merits of the Minnesota statute under the First 
Amendment.  See generally id. at 1893–97 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Rather, Justice 
Sotomayor’s disagreement with the Court was procedural in nature.  See id. at 1893.  She would 
have certified the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court, thereby affording that court the 
opportunity to construe Minnesota’s political apparel statute.  See id. 
88 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
89 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1890. 
90 Id. at 1891 (quoting Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 576 
(1987)). 
91 Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1424; see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
92 Compare Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1884 (describing the Election Day Policy), with 
Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. at 1424 (interpreting the Johnson Amendment). 
93 See id. at 1882. 
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intervention “issue advocacy” that does not mention any candidate, 
political party, or ballot question.94 
In particular, Revenue Ruling 2007-41 cautions that 
section 501(c)(3) organizations must avoid any issue advocacy 
that functions as political campaign intervention.  Even if a 
statement does not expressly tell an audience to vote for or 
against a specific candidate, an organization delivering the 
statement is at risk of violating the political campaign 
intervention prohibition if there is any message favoring or 
opposing a candidate. . . . All the facts and circumstances need 
to be considered to determine if the advocacy is political 
campaign intervention.95 
According to Revenue Ruling 2007-41, among the “facts and 
circumstances” indicating whether issue advocacy is forbidden 
campaign activity “favoring or opposing a candidate” is “[w]hether 
the issue addressed in the communication has been raised as an issue 
distinguishing candidates for a given office.”96 
Revenue Ruling 2007-41 identifies mitigating factors that tend to 
save a particular instance of issue advocacy from being classified as 
forbidden campaign intervention.97  For example, issue advocacy is 
less likely to be deemed prohibited campaign intervention if “the 
communication is part of an ongoing series of communications by the 
organization on the same issue that are made independent of the 
timing of any election.”98  However, at the end of the day, according 
to Revenue Ruling 2007-41, it is a matter of “facts and 
circumstances”99 whether issue advocacy is forbidden campaign 
intervention that costs a 501(c)(3) organization its tax-exempt its 
status100—with all of the uncertainties inherent in any “facts and 
circumstances” test. 
The vague rule of Revenue Ruling 2007-41 that issue advocacy may 
constitute forbidden campaign intervention depending on the “facts 
and circumstances” violates the First Amendment standard of 
reasonability laid out in Minnesota Voters Alliance.  Like Minnesota’s 
 
94 Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. at 1424. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 See id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1423. 
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ban on political apparel at polling places, Revenue Ruling 2007-41’s 
concept of “issue advocacy” is unmoored, proscribing in 
indeterminate fashion statements about issues of public policy.101  
Under Revenue Ruling 2007-41, a statement may be deemed to be 
forbidden campaign intervention even when that statement does not 
refer to any candidate, political party, or ballot question.102  Revenue 
Ruling 2007-41 lacks objective, workable standards when it declares 
that, depending on the “facts and circumstances,” a tax-exempt 
organization’s pronouncement on a public policy issue may violate 
the Johnson Amendment’s ban on political campaigning—even if 
such pronouncement does not mention any candidate, political party, 
or ballot question at issue in a pending election.103 
Consider, for example, a minister who wants to deliver a sermon 
for or against removing statues of Robert E. Lee.  Could that sermon 
be considered forbidden campaign intervention under the issue 
advocacy standard of Revenue Ruling 2007-41?  It depends.  The 
uncertainties of Revenue Ruling 2007-41’s “facts and circumstances” 
test could have a chilling effect on this minister’s decision to speak.  
Suppose that the minister guesses wrong and gives a sermon for or 
against Lee statues while candidates for office in the community are 
advancing similar arguments.  In this case, the minister’s sermon 
could retrospectively be deemed campaign intervention “favoring or 
opposing a candidate” for purposes of the Johnson Amendment.104  If 
so, her church would lose its tax-exempt status under section 
501(c)(3) because the topic of her sermon is characterized “as an issue 
distinguishing candidates for a given office.”105 
Under Minnesota Voters Alliance, a voter has a First Amendment 
right to wear to the polls a t-shirt supporting or opposing the removal 
of Robert E. Lee statues so long as no candidate, party, or ballot 
question is mentioned.106  It is, thus, troubling for Revenue Ruling 
2007-41 to indicate that, depending upon particular “facts and 
circumstances,” the minister’s sermon about Lee statues might cost 
her church its tax-exempt status for political campaigning, even if the 
minister’s sermon mentions no candidate, party or ballot question. 
 
101 Cf. Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1888 (2018). 
102 See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. at 1424. 
103 See id.; cf. Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891 (noting that election judges’ discretion 
must be guided by “objective, workable standards” to prevent bias in determining what 
constitutes forbidden political activity). 
104 Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. at 1424. 
105 Id. at 1421, 1424. 
106 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891. 
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Minnesota Voters Alliance holds that regulatory restrictions on 
political expression must be “objective”  and “workable.”107  
Prohibitions on polling place apparel meet this First Amendment test 
if they prevent the display of the names of candidates, parties, and 
ballot issues involved in the current election.108  More generalized 
prohibitions on “political” clothing and buttons do not meet this test 
of determinacy.109  By analogy, the Johnson Amendment can, 
consistent with the norms of the First Amendment, prohibit 501(c)(3) 
organizations from endorsing or opposing candidates, parties, and 
ballot questions.  But the Johnson Amendment cannot preclude 
broader issue advocacy by tax-exempt organizations when such 
advocacy leaves unmentioned candidates, parties, and ballot 
issues.110  Insofar as Revenue Ruling 2007-41 understands the 
Johnson Amendment as banning broader issue advocacy, that 
revenue ruling fails to give adequate notice as to what speech is or is 
not proscribed by section 501(c)(3).  Revenue Ruling 2007-41 is, thus, 
constitutionally infirm in light of Minnesota Voters Alliance. 
Consider another example that highlights the unconstitutional 
indeterminacy of Revenue Ruling 2007-41’s restrictions on issue 
advocacy.  Suppose that a 501(c)(3) organization is located in a major 
metropolitan area in which multiple campaigns are occurring for 
different seats in the Congress and in the state legislature.  Different 
candidates in different races will raise different issues to advance 
their particular candidacies.  Revenue Ruling 2007-41’s restriction on 
issue advocacy implies that this tax-exempt institution and its 
personnel must monitor all of these electoral contests and must 
refrain from discussing any issue that distinguishes the candidates 
in any one of these races.111  Confronted with this daunting task, this 
501(c)(3) entity may prudently protect its tax-exempt status by 
eschewing all issues of public concern to avoid political campaigning 
for purposes of the Johnson Amendment.  This blanket silencing of 
general political speech is the outcome that the First Amendment test 
of Minnesota Voters Alliance prevents. 
 
107 Id. 
108 See, e.g., id. 
109 See id. at 1888 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
808–09 (1985)). 
110 See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1424–25. 
111 See id. at 1424. 
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III.  THE CAMPAIGN INTERVENTION OF OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ENTITIES 
While the Johnson Amendment of section 501(c)(3) is the best 
known of the Code’s restrictions on the political activities of tax-
exempt organizations, the federal tax law also governs the political 
activities of other tax-exempt entities including civic 
organizations,112 labor unions,113 and business leagues.114  Section 
527(f) of the Code subjects to corporate taxation the political 
expenditures of these and similar entities, which are tax-exempt 
under section 501.115  Specifically, section 527(f) taxes at the 
corporate income tax rate the lesser of the “exempt function” 
expenditures of such an entity or such an entity’s net investment 
income.116 
For purposes of this tax, section 527(e)(2) defines a taxable exempt 
function as 
the function of influencing or attempting to influence the 
selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any 
individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or office 
in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or 
Vice-Presidential electors, whether or not such individual or 
electors are selected, nominated, elected, or appointed.117 
Suppose, for example, that in 2018 a labor union tax-exempt under 
section 501(c)(5) has net investment income from dividends of $1,000 
and spends $500 “to influence” a state legislative election.  In light of 
the current federal corporate income tax of twenty-one percent,118 
this union owes the section 527(f) tax in the amount of $105.119 
Just as Minnesota Voters Alliance indicates that the Johnson 
Amendment must be construed objectively and workably to comply 
with the First Amendment, that decision also indicates that section 
527 must also be understood to comport with the First Amendment 
requirement of reasonable determinacy. 
 
112 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012). 
113 § 501(c)(5). 
114 § 501(c)(6). 
115 See I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (2012). 
116 See § 527(f)(1) 
117 § 527(e)(2). 
118 I.R.C. § 11(b) (2012 & Supp. V 2018). 
119 $500 × 21% = $105. 
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However, like Revenue Ruling 2007-41, Revenue Ruling 2004-6120 
unconstitutionally construes “influence” for section 527 purposes in 
imprecise, overly broad terms.  Revenue Ruling 2004-6 contends that, 
depending upon the “facts and circumstances,” issue advocacy by a 
business league, labor union or civic organization may constitute 
taxable “exempt function” activity under section 527 even if no 
candidate is explicitly supported or opposed.121  In three of the six 
examples in Revenue Ruling 2004-6, the IRS concludes that issue 
advocacy is a taxable expenditure under section 527(f) even though 
in none of these examples is a candidate endorsed or rejected.122  Per 
Minnesota Voters Alliance, such a vague “facts and circumstances” 
restriction on the speech of nonprofit entities is unconstitutional. 
Consider, for example, situation three of Revenue Ruling 2004-6.  
In that example, an entity exempt from a tax under section 501(c)(4) 
runs a full-page newspaper ad “shortly before an election.”123  The ad 
supports a federal allocation to build a hospital and mentions that 
the state’s U.S. senator twice voted for such funding.124  The senator 
is running for re-election.  The ad does not explicitly endorse the 
senator or urge her re-election.125  Revenue Ruling 2004-6 concludes 
that this advertisement is an “exempt function,” which triggers the 
tax imposed by section 527(f) as an attempt to influence an 
election.126 
This conclusion contradicts the teaching of Minnesota Voters 
Alliance.  No statement in this newspaper ad urges voters to re-elect 
(or vote against) the senator.  The ruling apparently deems this ad to 
be campaign intervention because it mentions the senator and occurs 
too close to election time.  But how close is too close?  Six months?  
Six weeks?  Six days?  If this 501(c)(4) organization guesses wrong 
under the “facts and circumstances” test of Revenue Ruling 2004-6, 
the organization owes the section 527(f) penalty tax for expressing its 
views on a matter of public concern.127 
While it may be plausible to view this ad as an attempt “to 
influence” the election, that is not the only possible interpretation of 
the ad.  The thrust of the ad is that federal funding for hospitals is 
 
120 Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328. 
121 See id. at 330. 
122 See id. at 331. 
123 Id. 
124 See id. 
125 See id. 
126 Id. 
127 See id. 
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desirable.  That is a legitimate comment on public policy. 
Situation four of Revenue Ruling 2004-6 is similar and is similarly 
troublesome for First Amendment purposes in light of Minnesota 
Voters Alliance.  In that example, an organization tax exempt under 
section 501(c)(4) runs radio ads favoring increased state funding for 
public education.128  These ads run “shortly before an election” in 
which an incumbent governor seeks to return to office.129  The 
governor had earlier vetoed an income tax increase designed to 
augment spending on public schools.130  The ad tells listeners to 
contact the governor but neither endorses nor opposes the governor 
or his opponent.131  The IRS concludes that these radio ads are 
“exempt function” outlays triggering the tax imposed by section 
527(f)—even though listeners are not asked to vote against (or for) 
the governor.132 
This example again implicates the uncertainty of timing under a 
“facts and circumstances” test: How close to the election is too close?  
Moreover, this pro-expenditure ad does not inform the listener of the 
governor’s record or her current position on school funding.133  The 
implicit premise of this example is that some listeners will know of 
the governor’s veto and will understand the ad as urging a vote 
against the governor.134  An equally plausible interpretation of the ad 
is that it means what it says: please call the governor and tell her you 
favor public school funding. 
Finally, situation six of Revenue Ruling 2004-6 involves a 501(c)(4) 
organization that opposes the death penalty.135  The governor of the 
state is running for re-election and supports the death penalty.136  
“[S]hortly before” the election, this organization runs a television 
advertisement opposing the death penalty.137  The advertisement 
does not mention the governor’s opponent and does not urge a vote 
against the governor.138  The advertisement notes the governor’s 
support for the death penalty and asks viewers to contact the 
 
128 See id. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. 
132 Id. 
133 See id. 
134 See id. 
135 Id. at 332. 
136 See id. 
137 Id. 
138 See id. 
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governor to oppose the death penalty.139  The IRS again concludes 
that this radio ad is an “exempt function” expenditure triggering 
taxation under section 527(f).140 
This situation is a stronger example for the IRS’s position than is 
situation four since in this example the anti-death penalty ad tells 
the viewer that the governor favors capital punishment.141  But, 
again, on its face, the advertisement only asks the viewer to contact 
the governor to oppose capital punishment.142  Is this ad too close to 
the election or so explicit as to constitute campaign intervention 
against the governor?  Minnesota Voters Alliance requires a more 
workable, more objective test under the First Amendment.143 
In all three of these examples, according to the IRS, an 
organization’s issue advocacy results in a taxable “exempt function” 
expenditure under section 527(f) even though no candidate for office 
is expressly endorsed or opposed.144  Minnesota Voters Alliance 
stands in contrast to the IRS’s position in these examples under 
section 527(f) of the Code.145  In all three of these situations, a tax-
exempt organization articulates neither explicit opposition to nor 
express support for a political candidate.146  Everything the Court 
found wrong with the Minnesota voting apparel statute is wrong with 
these examples.  The IRS’s understanding of an “exempt function” 
expenditure that attempts to “influence” an election is indeterminate, 
reaching beyond explicit endorsements of, or opposition to, 
candidates to tax more generalized discussions of political issues.  
Under Minnesota Voters Alliance, Revenue Ruling 2004-6’s “facts and 
circumstances” understanding of what constitutes an attempt to 
“influence” an election is insufficiently “objective” or “workable” for 
First Amendment purposes.147 
Consider another hypothetical under section 527(f) of the Code.  
Suppose that a union prints and distributes a brochure denouncing 
 
139 See id. 
140 Id. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. 
143 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891 (2018). 
144 See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. at 331–32. 
145 Compare Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1888 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & 
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808–09 (1985)) (“[T]he State must be able to articulate some 
sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out.”), with Rev. Rul. 
2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. at 331–32 (demonstrating that the IRS sometimes will and sometimes will 
not find an “exempt function” without express support or opposition). 
146 See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. at 331. 
147 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891. 
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the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Janus v. American 
Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31.148  
Has the union thereby engaged in a taxable exempt function for 
purposes of the section 527 tax?  It depends.  If the union has no net 
investment income, it will not, in practice, care since zero net 
investment income produces no tax under section 527(f) of the 
Code.149  But, as a constitutional matter, it is problematic after 
Minnesota Voters Alliance to declare that discussion of issues of 
public concern (like Janus) might trigger the “exempt function” tax 
depending upon the factual circumstances in which the discussion 
occurs. 
Such generalized issue advocacy might also cost an organization its 
tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(4).  Treasury Regulation 
section 1.501(c)(4)-1150 states that a civic league must promote “social 
welfare.”151  The regulation further provides that “[t]he promotion of 
social welfare does not include direct or indirect participation or 
intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to 
any candidate for public office.”152 
This regulatory standard is also unconstitutionally indeterminate 
under Minnesota Voters Alliance.  “[I]ndirect . . . intervention” in a 
political race goes beyond support for, or opposition to, a candidate 
and might, depending upon the facts and circumstances, encompass 
general issue advocacy that “indirect[ly]” supports or opposes a 
candidate.153 
Minnesota Voters Alliance indicates that when political speech is 
regulated, it must be regulated reasonably, in an objective, workable 
fashion.  In light of Minnesota Voters Alliance, Revenue Ruling 
2004-6, interpreting section 527(f) of the Code, and Treasury 
Regulation section 1.501(c)(4)-1, interpreting section 501(c)(4) of the 
Code, are overly broad and indeterminate.  These imprecise measures 
accordingly must be reformed to give tax-exempt organizations better 
notice of the political activity that can trigger taxation or loss of tax-
exempt status. 
 
148 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
149 See I.R.C. § 527(f)(1)(A) (2012). 
150 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1 (as amended in 1990). 
151 Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(1)(ii). 
152 Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii). 
153 See id. 
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IV.  THE CODE’S BAN ON TAX-EXEMPT ENTITIES’ LOBBYING 
A. The General Ban on 501(c)(3) Organizations’ Lobbying 
Just as the bans on general issue advocacy established by Revenue 
Rulings 2007-41 and 2004-6 unconstitutionally restrict political 
speech under Minnesota Voters Alliance, the Treasury regulation 
implementing section 501(c)(3)’s prohibition on lobbying is 
“unmoored” and “indeterminate” for First Amendment purposes.  As 
a statutory matter, section 501(c)(3) of the Code provides that “no 
substantial part of the activities” of an organization tax exempt 
under section 501(c)(3) may consist of “carrying on propaganda, or 
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.”154  This statutory 
prohibition on “influenc[ing] legislation” is often characterized as a 
ban on “lobbying” by 501(c)(3) entities.155  
The Treasury regulation interpreting section 501(c)(3)’s lobbying 
ban states that a tax-exempt organization offends this ban if the 
organization 
(a) Contacts, or urges the public to contact, members of a 
legislative body for the purpose of proposing, supporting, or 
opposing legislation; or (b) Advocates the adoption or rejection 
of legislation.156 
This expansive regulation runs afoul of Minnesota Voters Alliance 
and the First Amendment standard of reasonability that Minnesota 
Voters Alliance promulgates for regulating political speech.157  Just 
as the undefined term political is indeterminate in the context of the 
Minnesota voter apparel statute, the undefined term legislation is 
indeterminate in the context of section 501(c)(3).158  Every issue of 
public policy can result in legislation.  Hence, the unmoored term 
legislation proscribes in this context most discussions of public 
concerns since such concerns can be framed as legislation.  Also 
overbroad is the statutory term substantial, which provides no real 
guidance as to the quantity of speech that causes the loss of an 
 
154 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
155 See §§ 501(c)(3), 4911(a)(1); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 543 
(1983) (articulating § 501(c)(3)’s ban on using tax-deductible contributions toward activities 
that influence legislation as a “prohibition against substantial lobbying”). 
156 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)(a)–(b) (as amended in 2017). 
157 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1888 (2018) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP 
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808–09 (1985)). 
158 See id. at 1889. 
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institution’s tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3). 
To see the unworkable nature of the undefined terms legislation 
and substantial and their unreasonably broad impact on political 
speech, consider again the minister who contemplates delivering a 
sermon for or against the removal of statues of Robert E. Lee.  This 
sermon might be the minister’s only statement ever touching on a 
matter of public controversy.  If so, this sermon can plausibly be 
considered an insubstantial part of the church’s activities. 
But, suppose that the minister regularly discusses from the pulpit 
issues of public interest such as abortion, same sex marriage, and 
immigration.  Consequently, section 501(c)(3) and the regulations 
implementing that section’s ban on lobbying require two, fact-based 
inquiries:159 First, is the minister’s proposed sermon about Lee 
statues, along with her other public policy pronouncements, a 
“substantial part” of the church’s activities?  Second, if they are, do 
the Lee homily and these other pronouncements “[a]dvocate[] the 
adoption or rejection of legislation[?]”160 
As I discuss in Section IV.B of this Article, Congress itself 
acknowledged the indeterminacy of these tests when, under sections 
501(h) and 4911,161 Congress gave many 501(c)(3) organizations the 
option to elect an objective safe harbor for lobbying expenditures.162  
However, important 501(c)(3) entities, including churches and their 
auxiliaries, cannot elect this safe harbor.163 
Thus, tax-exempt entities confront the question of what constitutes 
advocacy for or against “legislation” for purposes of section 501(c)(3).  
Since any issue of public policy can be framed as legislation, any 
statement on a matter of public concern can be construed as a 
comment for or against “legislation.” 
Consider again a sermon supporting the retention or removal of 
 
159 See Mysteryboy Inc. v. Comm’r, No. 21011-08X, 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 14, at *42 
(T.C. Jan. 26, 2010). 
160 See § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)(b); see also Mysteryboy, 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 14, at *42 
(“Under section 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) . . . , an organization is an action organization if a 
substantial part of its activities is attempting to influence legislation by propaganda or 
otherwise. . . . [A]n organization is to be regarded as attempting to influence legislation if the 
organization (1) contacts, or urges the public to contact, members of a legislative body for the 
purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation or (2) advocates the adoption or 
rejection of legislation.”). 
161 See I.R.C. § 501(h) (2012 & Supp. V 2018); I.R.C. § 4911 (2012).  For more background on 
these provisions of the Code, see ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH, supra note, 12, at 191, and 
Zelinsky, Safe Harbor, supra note 12 at 1532. 
162 See §§ 501(h)(1)(A), 4911(c). 
163 See § 501(h)(5)(A)–(B). 
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Lee statues.  City councils can by ordinance confirm their respective 
communities’ Lee statue or can mandate the statue’s removal.164  
Similarly, both state165 and federal166 legislation can address the 
subject of Lee statues.  Thus, this sermon is plausibly characterized 
as advocating or opposing legislation—even if no particular 
ordinance is mentioned in the sermon or is pending in the community 
in which the church is located.  To urge the removal or retention of a 
Lee statue is to advocate “legislation,” unless that term is qualified 
to make it more objective and workable. 
Likewise, suppose that the president of a tax-exempt hospital 
devotes considerable effort discussing the dangers of opioid abuse.  
This, too, is a matter of public concern that can result in legislation.167 
In short, for purposes of section 501(c)(3)’s general ban on tax-
exempt organizations’ lobbying, it is often unclear when an 
organization’s comments constitute lobbying for legislation as most 
topics of public concern can be addressed through legislation.  It is, 
moreover, ambiguous when lobbying is “substantial.”168  It is, thus, 
uncertain when public comments by a 501(c)(3) entity and its 
personnel will jeopardize that entity’s tax-exempt status due to 
statutorily forbidden lobbying.  That uncertainty runs afoul of the 
First Amendment teaching of Minnesota Voters Alliance that, to be 
reasonable, restrictions on political speech must be workable, 
objective, and determinate.169 
B. The Safe Harbor Lobbying Ban of Sections 501(h) and 4911 
In recognition of the uncertainties surrounding the section 
501(c)(3) ban on lobbying, Congress provided in sections 501(h) and 
4911 a statutory safe harbor that many (but not all) 501(c)(3) 
organizations may elect.170  Though this safe harbor was enacted as 
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,171 this safe harbor addresses the 
 
164 See NEW ORLEANS, LA. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 146-611(b) (2014). 
165 See H.B. 1099, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 100-
2.1 (2018) (“[A] monument, memorial, or work of art owned by the State may not be removed, 
relocated, or altered in any way without the approval of the North Carolina Historical 
Commission.”). 
166 See Robert E. Lee Statue Removal Act, H.R. 3779, 115th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 2017). 
167 See Combating Opioid Abuse for Care in Hospitals Act of 2018, H.R. 5774, 115th Cong. 
(2d Sess. 2018). 
168 See § 501(c)(3). 
169 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891 (2018). 
170 See I.R.C. § 501(h)(1)–(5) (2012 & Supp. V 2018); I.R.C. § 4911(a) (2012). 
171 See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1307, 90 Stat. 825, 1720 (1976) (codified 
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First Amendment concerns that Minnesota Voters Alliance 
articulated four decades later.  Central to this elective safe harbor 
are the statutory terms legislation, action, and influencing 
legislation.172  For these purposes, legislation is defined to include 
“action with respect to Acts, bills, resolutions, or similar items by the 
Congress, any State legislature, any local council, or similar 
governing body, or by the public in a referendum, initiative, 
constitutional amendment, or similar procedure.”173 
For purposes of this safe harbor, the statutory term action is 
“limited to the introduction, amendment, enactment, defeat, or 
repeal of Acts, bills, resolution, or similar items.”174  Influencing 
legislation, a/k/a lobbying, is then defined as “any attempt to 
influence any legislation through [either] an attempt to affect the 
opinions of the general public or any segment thereof . . . [or] 
communication with any member or employee of a legislative body, 
or with any government official or employee who may participate in 
the formulation of the legislation.”175 
For purposes of the lobbying safe harbor created by sections 501(h) 
and 4911, the statutory term influencing legislation excludes, among 
other activities, the internal communications of an organization with 
“its bona fide members”176 unless such communication “directly 
encourage[s]” such members either to themselves lobby any 
legislator, legislative employee, government official or government 
employee,177 or to “urge” nonmembers to engage in such lobbying.178 
This detailed definition of legislation and forbidden (and 
permitted) lobbying replaces for electing entities the unmoored, 
expansive term legislation as used in section 501(c)(3).  Consider 
again the president of a tax-exempt hospital who speaks about the 
dangers of opioid abuse.  As long as she does not advocate a particular 
bill pending before a legislative body or the electorate, these 
comments are not efforts to “influence legislation”—if the hospital 
has made the safe harbor lobbying election of section 501(h).179  
Under that safe harbor, general discussion of public policy issues is 
 
as amended at I.R.C. § 501(h)). 
172 See § 4911(a)(1)–(2). 
173 § 4911(e)(2). 
174 § 4911(e)(3). 
175 § 4911(d)(1)(A)–(B). 
176 § 4911(d)(2)(D). 
177 § 4911(d)(3)(A). 
178 § 4911(d)(3)(B). 
179 See I.R.C. § 501(h) (2012 & Supp. V 2018); § 4911(d)(1)(A)–(B). 
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excluded from the definition of forbidden lobbying even if such issues 
could (as most do) result in the adoption of legislation.180  Even if this 
hospital president does advocate “action” with respect to particular 
legislation, her comments will not jeopardize her institution’s tax-
exempt status under section 501(c)(3) unless the hospital’s overall 
lobbying activities trigger the dollar levels established by sections 
501(h) and 4911—but, again, only if the hospital has made the safe 
harbor election for its lobbying activities.181  If not, these comments 
by the hospital president potentially run afoul of the expansive and 
unmoored lobbying ban of section 501(c)(3). 
Contrast this with the minister’s discussion of Lee statues.  
Because the church cannot elect the safe harbor of section 501(h),182 
this minister cannot be sure whether or not her sermon is forbidden 
lobbying or whether, combined with her other statements, her 
sermon is “substantial.”183  Unlike section 4911, section 501(c)(3) 
contains no protection for communications within the church.184  This 
minister and her church, in contrast to the hospital that makes the 
section 501(h) election, are subject to the indeterminacy which, per 
Minnesota Voters Alliance, violates the First Amendment tests of 
workability and objectivity. 
V.  IMPLEMENTING MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE: EXPRESS 
ADVOCACY AND FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE 
Per Minnesota Voters Alliance, the First Amendment test of 
reasonability requires that restrictions on political expression be 
objective, workable, and determinant.185  However, the particular 
rule used to implement that test in Minnesota Voters Alliance does 
not work well in other settings, namely, the Johnson Amendment, 
the section 527(f) tax on political campaign intervention, and the 
regulatory prohibition on campaigning by civic leagues.  Rather than 
the “no mention” rule Minnesota Voters Alliance approves for voting 
place apparel prohibitions, I argue in this Part that, in the context of 
the Code’s bans on campaigning by tax-exempt entities, the First 
Amendment requirement of reasonability is best implemented 
through Chief Justice Roberts’ test articulated in FEC v. Wisconsin 
 
180 See § 4911(d)(1)(A)–(B). 
181 See § 501(h); 4911(c)(2). 
182 See § 501(h)(5). 
183 See § 501(c)(3). 
184 See § 501(h)(5). 
185 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891 (2018). 
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Right to Life, Inc.: Only express advocacy of candidates, parties, or 
ballot questions, or the “functional equivalent” of such express 
advocacy should run afoul of the tax law.186  Functional equivalence 
should be construed narrowly,187 as the Chief Justice indicated, to 
include only speech “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other 
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate[,]” party 
or ballot question.188 
In the context of section 501(c)(3)’s lobbying ban, I suggest that the 
statutory standards of section 4911 be applied to all tax-exempt 
entities, not just to those that make the safe harbor election under 
section 501(h).  These changes could be implemented 
administratively or by congressional modification of the Code.189 
Under Minnesota Voters Alliance, a state may maintain polling 
place decorum by forbidding at the polls clothing or buttons that 
mention candidates, parties, or ballot questions involved in the 
current election.190  This “no mention” test works well for voting place 
apparel because voting is a discrete activity that occurs briefly at a 
particular point in time.191  It is easy to ascertain who is a candidate 
in the current election, the parties that have fielded candidates, and 
any ballot issues being decided.  Consequently, at the polls, 
forbidding the names of candidates, parties, or ballot questions is a 
workable and objective rule, easily administrable at the specific point 
in time of a particular election. 
However, this “no mention” test does not transfer well to other 
settings that occur over extended periods.  A rule against naming 
candidates, parties, and ballot questions is overly broad in these 
other contexts and can interfere with much generalized political 
discussion. 
Our political culture today is a “permanent campaign.”192  Except 
for public officials who are term-limited or who have formally 
renounced re-election, all public officials are continually running for 
re-election around the calendar.193  If the no-mention-of-a-candidate 
rule applied under the Johnson Amendment, 501(c)(3) organizations 
could never articulate the name of any elected officials since today all 
 
186 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007). 
187 See id. 
188 Id. at 470. 
189 See Benjamin J. Cohen & Catherine A. Harrington, Is the Internal Revenue Service 
Bound by Its Own Regulations and Rulings?, 51 TAX LAWYER 675, 675 (1998). 
190 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891. 
191 See Stewart, supra note 33, at 450. 
192 See, e.g., Heclo, supra note 34, at 1. 
193 See, e.g., id. at 17. 
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officials are continuously candidates.  Such an overly broad 
restriction would forbid much speech that is not campaign 
intervention. 
Suppose, for example, that a church informs its parishioners that 
the local congresswoman will be holding an informational session for 
current and prospective social security recipients.  Under a rule 
forbidding a 501(c)(3) entity from mentioning the name of a 
candidate, the Johnson Amendment would forbid this statement 
unless the congresswoman had announced that this is her last term 
in office.194  If the congresswoman is running for re-election (as most 
representatives interminably are), this church would violate the 
Johnson Amendment under a test forbidding a church or other tax-
exempt institution from uttering the name of a candidate.195  
Members of Congress are today continuously candidates. 
Consider again the minister who wants to deliver a sermon for or 
against retaining statues of Robert E. Lee.  If a community is voting 
on an ordinance on this subject, it is workable to declare that no 
buttons or clothing may be worn at the polls mentioning this topic.196  
But, per Minnesota Voters Alliance, it violates the First Amendment 
to leave the minister in a legal limbo, not knowing whether or not, 
under a facts-and-circumstances test, her sermon could retroactively 
be deemed campaign intervention or lobbying, which would cost her 
church its tax-exempt status because candidates for office had 
discussed this issue.197 
The best way to implement Minnesota Voters Alliance in the 
contexts of the Johnson Amendment and of sections 527(f) and 
501(c)(4) is the test articulated by Chief Justice Roberts in FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.198  Under that test, tax-exempt 
organizations’ political speech would be prohibited or taxed as 
forbidden campaigning only if such speech were express advocacy of 
a candidate, political party or ballot question or were the “functional 
equivalent” of such express advocacy.199 
The Chief Justice formulated this test against the background of 
Buckley v. Valeo200 and McConnell v. FEC.201  In its review of section 
 
194 See ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH, supra note 12, at 188–89. 
195 See id. 
196 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1888, 1891 (2018). 
197 See id. at 1888–89. 
198 See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007). 
199 Id. 
200 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
201 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 90 (2003); see Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 456–57 
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608(e)(1)202 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the 
Buckley Court subjected to First Amendment scrutiny that section’s 
limits on “any expenditure . . . relative to a clearly identified 
candidate.”203  The statutory phrase relative to, the Buckley Court 
observed, “fails to clearly mark the boundary between permissible 
and impermissible speech.”204  To avoid unconstitutional vagueness, 
that phrase must “be read to mean ‘advocating the election or defeat 
of’ a candidate.”205  But, the Court continued, even “this construction” 
of the phrase relative to does not “eliminate[] the problem of 
unconstitutional vagueness altogether.”206  “For the distinction 
between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election 
or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application.”207  
Thus, “in order to preserve the provision against invalidation on 
vagueness grounds, § 608(e)(1) must be construed to apply only to 
expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.”208 
Even as so “narrowly and explicitly” construed to avoid 
unconstitutional vagueness,209 the Court held that the expenditure 
limits established by § 608(e)(1) fail First Amendment muster 
because such limits burden an individual’s ability to communicate 
her views.210  For our purposes, Buckley implemented the distinction 
between “express” support for candidates and other political speech 
in an important footnote that gave rise to what derisively became 
known as the “magic words”211 of that opinion: “This construction 
would restrict the application of § 608(e)(1) to communications 
containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as 
‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ 
‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’”212 
The Buckley Court also subjected to First Amendment vagueness 
analysis the Act’s requirement that individuals disclose their 
expenditures “for the purpose of . . . influencing” the process of 
 
(first quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206; and then quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42). 
202 18 U.S.C. § 608 (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976). 
203 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39. 
204 Id. at 41. 
205 Id. at 42. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 44. 
209 Id. 
210 See id. at 52. 
211 See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 90, 127 (2003). 
212 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. 
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electing federal officers.213  In this setting, the Court “encounter[ed] 
line-drawing problems of the sort”214 arising in the context of 
§ 608(e)(1) and that section’s prohibition of expenditures “relative to” 
federal candidacies.215  Like the phrase relative to, the term for the 
purpose of influencing  “shares the same potential for encompassing 
both issue discussion and advocacy of a political result.”216  To insure 
that the definition of “expenditure” (and its attendant disclosure 
requirement) “is not impermissibly broad,”217 the Buckley Court 
opined, “[W]e construe ‘expenditure’ . . . in the same way we 
construed the terms of § 608(e)—to reach only funds used for 
communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate.”218  “As [so] narrowed,”219 the 
expenditure disclosure requirement was held constitutional.220 
Twenty-seven years after Buckley, the Court revisited and found 
wanting that opinion’s distinction between express advocacy and 
more generalized issue advocacy.221  In McConnell v. FEC, a five-
Justice majority declared that “[w]hile the distinction between ‘issue’ 
and express advocacy seemed neat in theory, the two categories of 
advertisements proved functionally identical in important 
respects.”222 
Advertisements could “avoid the use of [Buckley’s] magic words”223 
but still effectively “advocate the election or defeat of clearly 
identified federal candidates.”224  This observation led the McConnell 
Court to uphold expenditure restrictions imposed by the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002: 
 Nor are we persuaded, independent of our precedents, that 
the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express 
advocacy and so-called issue advocacy.  That notion cannot be 
squared with our longstanding recognition that the presence 
 
213 2 U.S.C. § 431(e) (1976) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8) (2012)); Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 63. 
214 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 78–79. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 79. 
217 Id. at 80. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 See id. at 80–81, 84. 
221 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003). 
222 Id. at 114, 196. 
223 Id. at 127. 
224 Id. at 126. 
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or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distinguish 
electioneering speech from a true issue ad. . . . Indeed, the 
unmistakable lesson from the record in this litigation, as all 
three judges on the District Court agreed, is that Buckley’s 
magic-words requirement is functionally meaningless.225 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 
Inc.226 subsequently breathed new life into Buckley’s distinction 
between express advocacy and more general issue advertising.227  
Wisconsin Right to Life upheld as-applied restrictions on corporate 
political expenditures only if such restrictions are limited to express 
advocacy of specific candidates or parties, and to “the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy.”228  The First Amendment requires 
that such equivalence be construed narrowly: “[A]n ad is the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible 
of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or 
against a specific candidate.”229 
Minnesota Voters Alliance reinforces the distinction (asserted in 
Buckley, discounted in McConnell, revived in Wisconsin Right to Life) 
between express advocacy and more generalized issue advocacy.230  
McConnell’s dismissal of “magic words” ignores the First Amendment 
values of Minnesota Voters Alliance:231 “magic words” of express 
advocacy are objective, workable, and determinate.  “Magic words” 
notify the speaker what he may and may not say.  “Magic words” of 
express advocacy cabin the discretion of those enforcing restrictions 
on political speech. 
Of course, skilled rhetoricians will try to skirt the limits of the 
magic words of express advocacy.  For example, to avoid a no-
mention-of-a-candidate rule, a voter in 2016 might have worn to the 
 
225 Id. at 193 (first citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976); then citing McConnell v. 
FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 303–04 (D.C. Dist. 2003) (opinion of Henderson, J.); id. at 534 
(opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. at 875–79 (opinion of Leon, J.)). 
226 See Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 455 (2007). 
227 See id. at 478–79. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 469–470.  Ultimately, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), held that 
expenditure restrictions cannot apply to corporations and labor unions as such.  See id. at 372 
(citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 341). 
230 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1888, 1891 (2018). 
231 Compare McConnell, 540 U.S. at 217 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45, 46, 48) (holding that 
the clear and objective “magic words” described in Buckley were unconstitutional and violated 
the First Amendment), with Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891 (finding that when regulating 
speech at polling places, a state must “employ a more discernible approach” than the open-
ended regulations promulgated by Minnesota). 
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polls a T-shirt that read, “It takes a village,” or, “You’re fired.”  Or a 
minister may have used either of these phrases from the pulpit. 
Chief Justice Roberts addressed this problem by defining “the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy” narrowly, as speech 
“susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal 
to vote for or against a specific candidate.”232  This circumscribed rule 
does not eliminate all potential borderline problems, determining 
what phrases are functionally equivalent to express advocacy.  
However, applied to tax-exempt entities, the Chief Justice’s narrow 
formulation of functional equivalence protects the exercise of First 
Amendment rights as Minnesota Voters Alliance mandates. 
No legislation is required to incorporate into the tax law the 
standards of Wisconsin Right to Life.233  As to the Johnson 
Amendment, the IRS can revise Revenue Ruling 2007-41 to replace 
that ruling’s current discussion of issue advocacy with a more 
determinate standard.234  Section 501(c)(3) status should be lost 
under the Johnson Amendment only by explicit support of, or 
opposition to, particular candidates, parties, or ballot questions or by 
expression that can only be reasonably understood as the functional 
equivalent of such overt advocacy. 
Likewise, the IRS should delete from Revenue Ruling 2004-6 the 
three examples, discussed above,235 under which the section 527(f) 
tax is triggered by the mere mention of an elected official near 
election time.  Instead, the tax should be levied only if a tax-exempt 
organization explicitly endorses or opposes a candidate for public 
office, a political party, or a ballot question or if such an organization 
engages in speech that can only be understood as the functional 
equivalent of such express support or opposition.  Finally, the 
Treasury regulation under section 501(c)(4) should be revised to 
indicate that tax-exempt status as a civic league is only forfeited for 
political campaigning if such campaigning takes the form of express 
advocacy or its functional equivalent.236 
 
232 Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 469–70. 
233 See generally id. (demonstrating that the Court can apply this standard on their own 
instead of waiting for a new standard to be legislated). 
234 See Cohen & Harrington, supra note 189, at 675. 
235 See supra text accompanying notes 72–80. 
236 On November 29, 2013, the Treasury proposed regulations under § 501(c)(4).  See 
Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Policy Activities, 
78 Fed. Reg. 71,535 (Nov. 19, 2013).  Congress subsequently blocked the promulgation of these 
regulations.  See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 127, 129 Stat. 
2242 (2015).  Whether the 116th Congress will permit the Treasury to proceed with these or 
other regulations remains to be seen. 
 
0001 ZELINSKY, APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE IRC 1/17/2020  2:37 PM 
2019/2020] Applying the First Amendment to the IRC 33 
In the absence of (or in lieu of) such administrative implementation 
of the First Amendment standards of Minnesota Voters Alliance, 
Congress could amend the relevant Code provisions—sections 
501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), 527(f)—to incorporate the Chief Justice’s test 
from Wisconsin Right to Life.237 
For those who would deride this approach as revivifying the “magic 
words” of express advocacy, I would agree with the premise but not 
the conclusion: Minnesota Voters Alliance and its First Amendment 
test of reasonability highlight the benefits of magic words.  Magic 
words are determinate, objective, and workable. 
To bring the lobbying ban of section 501(c)(3) into congruence with 
the First Amendment standards of Minnesota Voters Alliance, the 
IRS or the Treasury could, by revenue ruling or regulation, 
incorporate into section 501(c)(3) the First Amendment-compliant 
definitions of section 4911.238  As an alternative to such 
administrative action, Congress could amend the Code to apply to 
section 501(c)(3) the definitions (“legislation,” “action,” “influencing 
legislation”) of section 4911.239  Either way, those more determinate 
definitions would apply to all 501(c)(3) organizations, not just to those 
organizations that can and do make the safe harbor lobbying election 
under section 501(h).  Thus, for example, as long as specific 
legislation is not endorsed, a sermon about Lee statues (or any other 
similarly controversial issue of public concern) would be protected as 
either internal communications among the church’s members or as 
commentary, which does not constitute forbidden lobbying with 
respect to particular pending legislation. 
VI.  REGAN V. TAXATION WITH REPRESENTATION 
Defenders of Revenue Rulings 2004-6 and 2007-41 and the current 
regulations under sections 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) might invoke 
Regan v. Taxation with Representation.  The nonprofit corporation 
Taxation with Representation (TWR) challenged the 
constitutionality of the section 501(c)(3) lobbying ban.240  The U.S. 
Supreme Court unanimously upheld it.241 
In contesting the 501(c)(3) lobbying ban, TWR argued that the ban 
 
237 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891 (2018); Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 
at 469–70. 
238 See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 4911(d)(1), (e)(2)–(3) (2012); Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891. 
239 See §§ 501(c)(3), § 4911(d)(1), (e)(2)–(3). 
240 Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 542 (1983). 
241 See id. at 540, 550. 
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was an “unconstitutional condition.”242  The Court agreed with TWR 
“that the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he 
exercises a constitutional right.”243  However, withholding tax-
exempt status from TWR under section 501(c)(3) because of forbidden 
lobbying, the Court held, does not deny a government-bestowed 
benefit.244  Rather, section 501(c)(3)’s prohibition of lobbying is 
“merely” the “refus[al] to pay for the lobbying out of public moneys”245 
in the form of tax-deductible contributions to tax-exempt entities: 
“Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying.”246 
Taxation with Representation, thus, upheld against First 
Amendment challenge the section 501(c)(3) ban on lobbying.247  A 
plausible reading of that decision is that it also sustains, under the 
First Amendment, the Code’s other provisions relative to tax-exempt 
organizations’ political speech, namely, the Johnson Amendment’s 
ban on campaigning,248 the section 527(f) tax on political activity,249 
and the regulatory prohibition on campaigning by 501(c)(4) civic 
leagues.250  These provisions also reflect a congressional choice not to 
pay for campaigning through tax-exemption or through the 
charitable contribution deduction. 
However, this reading of Taxation with Representation does not 
challenge my argument.  I do not contend that Minnesota Voters 
Alliance invalidates the provisions of the tax law regulating and 
taxing the political speech of tax-exempt entities.  Minnesota Voters 
Alliance does indicate that, under the First Amendment, these 
provisions must be construed reasonably to provide “objective”251 and 
“workable”252 standards to identify in determinate fashion forbidden 
lobbying and campaign intervention. 
 
242 Id. at 545 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958)). 
243 Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 545 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 
597 (1972)). 
244 See Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 545. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. at 546. 
247 See id. at 550, 551. 
248 See generally id. (“Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying.”); Laura 
Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence., 58 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 308, 346–47 (1990) (discussing the Johnson Amendment). 
249 See Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 546; Chisolm, supra note 248, at 330 n.105. 
250 See Taxation with Representation, 361 U.S. at 546; Chisolm, supra note 248, at 328–29.  
Professor Chisholm disagreed with this reading of Taxation with Representation.  Id. at 322 
(“Taxation with Representation does not settle the question of whether the section 501(c)(3) 
prohibition on campaign participation is an unconstitutional condition.”). 
251 Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891 (2018). 
252 Id. 
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The content of the 501(c)(3) ban on lobbying was not at issue in 
Taxation with Representation.253  TWR did not claim that the section 
501(c)(3) concepts of substantiality and legislation had to be 
construed narrowly to pass First Amendment scrutiny.254  Rather, 
TWR argued that section 501(c)(3)’s lobbying ban should be struck 
altogether.255  The Supreme Court rejected this claim.256  The Court 
did not rule on the First Amendment need to construe the 
“expansive”257 statutory concept of “legislation” since TWR did not 
assert the need for determinacy.258  TWR wanted the lobbying ban 
invalidated altogether.259 
Taxation with Representation can, thus, be reconciled with 
Minnesota Voters Alliance.  Minnesota Voters Alliance approved 
“objective” and “workable” restrictions on political expression at the 
polls while striking as unconstitutionally unreasonable “unmoored,” 
“indeterminate” prohibitions on such expression.260  Under this 
approach to the First Amendment, the Johnson Amendment, the 
section 501(c)(3) ban on lobbying, the section 527(f) tax, and the 
regulatory ban on section 501(c)(4) campaigning must be construed 
to provide fair notice of what behavior is (and is not) permitted under 
those provisions.  Consistent with the First Amendment, the Johnson 
Amendment can prevent 501(c)(3) entities from endorsing or 
opposing specific candidates, parties, and ballot questions.261  But the 
Johnson Amendment can do no more than this.  In particular, the 
Johnson Amendment cannot proscribe a tax-exempt entity’s “issue 
advocacy” if the entity does not expressly support or reject particular 
candidates, parties, or ballot issues, or does not engage in expression, 
which is the functional equivalent of such explicit advocacy. 
Likewise, section 501(c)(3)’s ban on lobbying can, per Taxation with 
Representation, prevent a tax-exempt entity from endorsing specific 
legislation pending before a legislative body or slated for a popular 
vote.262  However, under Minnesota Voters Alliance, the section 
 
253 See Taxation with Representation, 361 U.S. at 551. 
254 See id. at 543–44. 
255 See id. at 543–44, 47 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980)). 
256 See Taxation with Representation, 361 U.S. at 551. 
257 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1888. 
258 See Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 542. 
259 See id. at 543–44. 
260 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1888–89, 1891. 
261 ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH, supra note 12, at 188. 
262 Cf. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 548 (“Congress could, for example, grant 
funds to an organization dedicated to combating teenage drug abuse, but condition the grant 
by providing that none of the money received from Congress should be used to lobby state 
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501(c)(3) lobbying ban cannot go beyond this to preclude all 
pronouncements on public policy because public policy can always be 
framed as proposed legislation. 
Professor Steven Heyman supports the Court’s decision in 
Taxation With Representation upholding the section 501(c)(3) 
lobbying ban.263  However, he argues that the Court was wrong in 
that case to approve the statutory ability of veterans’ groups to lobby 
while retaining their tax-exemptions under section 501(c)(19).264  
Granting tax-exempt veterans’ organizations permission to lobby 
while denying such permission to section 501(c)(3) entities, he 
contends, “unjustifiably discriminat[es] between citizens in the 
political realm” in a manner that “clearly violate[s] equal 
protection.”265 
If Congress were to agree with Professor Heyman and deny tax-
exempt veterans’ groups the license to lobby, the holding of 
Minnesota Voters Alliance would apply to any such denial.266  Hence, 
a statutory lobbying ban could not preclude tax-exempt veterans’ 
groups from engaging in general discussion of public concerns.  Under 
the First Amendment, such a ban could prohibit explicit support for, 
or opposition to, proposals pending before a legislative body or 
scheduled for popular vote.  Such a ban under section 501(c)(19) could 
also preclude tax-exempt veterans’ organizations from engaging in 
the “functional equivalent” of such express advocacy, as Chief Justice 
Roberts narrowly defined such equivalence in Wisconsin Right to 
Life.267  However, a statutory ban on lobbying by tax-exempt 
veterans’ groups, like the prohibition on lobbying by section 501(c)(3) 
organizations, could not preclude more generalized discussion of 
political issues. 
VII.  THREE REJOINDERS 
A. It’s Just About Clothing 
A potential rejoinder to my analysis is that Minnesota Voters 
Alliance is just about clothing at the polls.  Polling place apparel was 
the particular factual context in which Minnesota Voters Alliance was 
 
legislatures.”). 
263 See Steven J. Heyman, State-Supported Speech, 1999 WIS. L REV. 1119, 1158, 1159. 
264 See id. at 1159. 
265 Id. at 1160. 
266 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891. 
267 See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007). 
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decided.268  While there is much dicta in that decision,269 the 
argument runs, the actual holding of Minnesota Voters Alliance is 
limited to clothing at voting places.270 
This rejoinder seeks to dismiss as dicta the broad articulation of 
First Amendment principles endorsed by seven Justices in Minnesota 
Voters Alliance.  However, Minnesota Voters Alliance did not restrict 
these principles to the subject of clothing.  Rather, that decision 
states First Amendment themes of general applicability, to wit, the 
First Amendment requires that governmentally-imposed restrictions 
on political speech be objective, workable, and determinate.271  
The best reading of Minnesota Voters Alliance is that it is not just 
a clothing case; the Court spoke in broader terms.272  Much of the 
Court’s observations are technically dicta, but there is a reason 
courts pronounce dicta. 
B. The Court’s Limited Endorsement of the Chief Justice’s 
Wisconsin Right to Life Test 
Another potential rejoinder would note that Chief Justice Roberts’s 
test in Wisconsin Right to Life, which I would incorporate into the tax 
law to comply with Minnesota Voters Alliance, was only endorsed by 
the Chief Justice and Justice Alito.273  The other three justices who 
voted for the outcome sought by the Chief Justice in Wisconsin Right 
to Life did so on different grounds.274 
This criticism highlights the heavily normative nature of my 
argument.  I urge that the test endorsed by the Chief Justice—
explicit advocacy or the functional equivalent of explicit advocacy—
is the best way to make the tax law consistent with the First 
Amendment standards of Minnesota Voters Alliance.  Even the four 
Justices who dissented in Wisconsin Right to Life should, after 
Minnesota Voters Alliance, find persuasive in the tax context the test 
fashioned by the Chief Justice.  That test assures that the tax law 
restrictions imposed on the political speech of tax-exempt institutions 
will be workable, objective, and determinate. 
Thus, to comply with the First Amendment standards of Minnesota 
 
268 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1882. 
269 See id. at 1890–91. 
270 Id. 
271 See id. at 1891. 
272 See id. at 1891 (quoting Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 576 
(1987)) (citing Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981)). 
273 See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 455 (2007). 
274 See id. at 483, 504 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Voters Alliance, the Johnson Amendment and the anti-campaigning 
regulation under section 501(c)(4) should just bar explicit advocacy 
and expression that can only be understood as the functional 
equivalent of such express advocacy.  Similarly, the section 527(f) tax 
should just be triggered under these circumstances, namely, when a 
tax-exempt entity explicitly speaks for or against a candidate, party, 
or ballot issue or engages in speech that can only be reasonably 
understood as the equivalent of such explicit advocacy.  Under this 
tightened standard, a tax-exempt institution could engage in more 
general issue advocacy without fear of losing its exempt status or 
being subject to taxation. 
In contrast to my call to incorporate into the tax law Chief Justice 
Roberts’s test from Wisconsin Right to Life, Professor Miriam Galston 
“conclude[s] that it would be inappropriate to import the campaign 
finance First Amendment standards developed by Citizens United 
and Wisconsin Right to Life into tax law First Amendment 
jurisprudence.”275  Professor Galston wrote in 2011, before the Court 
decided Minnesota Voters Alliance.  However, her argument could be 
updated to suggest that the standards of Minnesota Voters Alliance 
extend more broadly than clothing but still do not apply to the Code. 
However, nothing in Minnesota Voters Alliance suggests that 
restrictions on political speech must be workable, objective, and 
determinate everywhere but the Code.276  There is today much 
interesting debate, both in the academy277 and in the judiciary,278 
about whether or not tax law is fundamentally different from other 
areas of the law.  For now, my claim is straightforward: nothing in 
Minnesota Voters Alliance indicates that the tax law should be 
exempted from that decision’s First Amendment standard that 
restrictions on political speech must be workable, objective, and 
determinate. 
Moreover, as a normative matter, there is no compelling reason 
why those First Amendment standards should not cover the tax law.  
The strongest indication that the tax law can restrict taxpayer’s 
 
275 Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and Wisconsin 
Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 867, 873–74 (2011). 
276 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891. 
277 See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power to Tax, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 633, 654–
55 (2017) (“[A]nother example of tax exceptionalism.”) (emphasis removed). 
278 See, e.g., Summa Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 848 F.3d 779, 784 (6th Cir. 2017) (“If this case 
dealt with any other title of the United States Code, we would stop there, end the suspense, 
and rule for [the taxpayers].”). 
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political expression is Taxation with Representation, which upheld 
against constitutional challenge the 501(c)(3) lobbying ban.279  But 
Minnesota Voters Alliance leaves that ban and Taxation with 
Representation intact: Congress can forbid 501(c)(3) entities from 
lobbying, but such forbidden lobbying must be defined in a workable 
and determinate manner along the lines of section 4911.  More 
general discussion of public policy should not be classified as 
prohibited lobbying because the policy discussed could lead to 
legislation. 
C. The IRS Does Not in Practice Enforce These Prohibitions 
Yet, another rejoinder would characterize as remote the practical 
threat to tax-exempt organizations from the restrictions of sections 
501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), and 527(f).  There is in practice, the rejoinder 
would go, little IRS enforcement effort aimed at the campaigning and 
lobbying of tax-exempt entities. 
To the extent that reported case law indicates the level of IRS 
enforcement activity, it is plausible to characterize the IRS’s efforts 
in this area as minimal, despite all of the controversy about these 
provisions.  There is little case law in which the IRS pursues tax-
exempt entities for forbidden lobbying or campaigning.280 
However, Minnesota Voters Alliance indicates that the relevant 
concern is not the IRS’s practical enforcement policies, but “the 
potential for erratic application”281 of an indeterminate law.  
Minnesota’s ban on political apparel is unconstitutional because it is 
not “capable of reasoned application.”282  Such “an indeterminate 
prohibition carries with it ‘[t]he opportunity for abuse.’”283 
This is equally true of the Code’s prohibitions on tax-exempt 
entities’ lobbying and campaigning.  Like the Minnesota apparel law, 
these equally indeterminate features of the tax statute create “the 
potential for erratic application.”284  From this vantage, the 
reasonability requirement of the First Amendment is violated when 
statutory vagueness creates “[t]he opportunity for abuse.”285  Even if 
 
279 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550, 551 (1983). 
280 The leading cases in this area still remain Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 
(D.C. Cir. 2000), and Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 
(10th Cir. 1972).  These are discussed in ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH, supra note 12, at 190–
91. 
281 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1890. 
282 Id. at 1892. 
283 Id. at 1891 (quoting Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 576). 
284 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1890. 
285 Id. at 1891 (quoting Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 576). 
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the IRS (or Minnesota’s election judges) in practice forbear from such 
abuse, the law that gives them such “opportunity” is unreasonable 
for First Amendment purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
The church-state entanglement issues raised by the Johnson 
Amendment and by the 501(c)(3) lobbying ban are best addressed by 
amending the Code to protect from all scrutiny the internal 
communications of churches, synagogues, temples, mosques, and all 
other religious congregations.286  In contrast, the First Amendment 
problems discussed in this Article do not require legislation, though 
they could be addressed that way. 
Minnesota Voters Alliance highlighted the First Amendment 
imperative that governmental regulation of political speech be 
objective, and workable, unlike current law, which regulates a 
nonprofit organization’s political expression in an overly broad and 
impermissibly vague manner.  After Minnesota Voters Alliance, the 
Johnson Amendment should be interpreted as only proscribing 
501(c)(3) entities from expressly endorsing or opposing particular 
candidates, political parties, or ballot questions or from engaging in 
the “functional equivalent” of such express advocacy.  Under this test, 
tax-exempt entities would not be precluded from engaging in more 
general issue advocacy.  Likewise, in light of Minnesota Voters 
Alliance, sections 501(c)(4) and 527(e) of the Code should be 
construed as precluding and taxing only express advocacy of, or 
opposition to, particular candidates, parties, or ballot questions or as 
prohibiting and taxing only the “functional equivalent” of such 
explicit expression.  Such functional equivalence should be 
understood narrowly as Chief Justice Roberts defined it in Wisconsin 
Right to Life, namely, a statement “susceptible of no reasonable 
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate,” party, or ballot question.287 
In light of Minnesota Voters Alliance, the 501(c)(3) lobbying ban 
should be understood similarly, as only prohibiting tax-exempt 
entities from explicitly supporting or opposing pending legislative 
proposals or from undertaking the functional equivalent of such 
explicit advocacy about pending legislation.  The 501(c)(3) lobbying 
 
286 See ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH, supra note 12, at 202; Zelinsky, Safe Harbor, supra 
note 12, at 1545; Edward A. Zelinsky, Continuing the Debate on the Johnson Amendment, 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV., Mar. 4, 2019, at 289, 293. 
287 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007). 
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ban should not prevent tax-exempt entities from discussing public 
policy questions more generally, even though such questions can be 
formulated as legislation. 
The Code would thereby continue to regulate the political 
expression of tax-exempt institutions but in ways which, unlike 
current law, are consistent with the First Amendment norms of 
reasonability, workability, objectivity, and determinacy articulated 
in Minnesota Voters Alliance. 
